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" [O] ne of the most consistent drivers of profound change in the area of cyberspace law has been the convergence of cloud-based products and services with the distribution and consumption of entertainment content. Specifically, the public's relentless desire for access to and consumption of 'any content, anywhere, at any time,' coupled with the widespread proliferation of Internet-connected consumer devices--from the mobile phone, to the tablet, to the Smart TV--has played a substantial role in the marked growth of novel cloud-based products and services." (Schnapp, 2013 at p.1).
2 "The [Internet] cloud's appeal is its flexibility. Using the government as a source of norms in the early stage of the technology's development will not only moot this flexibility, but will also have the effect of locking the technology in at its current state. A government-centric regulatory model in cloud computing is inadvisable, as government is not sufficiently responsive to keep pace with the rapid manner in which technology evolves. Consumers will be the ones to shoulder the burdens of the cost of regulations made in ignorance of the technology's full potential." (Celestine, 2013 p.158 ) . "With the convergence of these various technologies--for instance, Voice Over Internet Protocol competing with circuit-switched telephony or Internet Protocol Television competing with broadcast and cable-[medium specific] . . . silo approach to regulation makes less sense today." ( Ohlhausena, 2013) . technologies and self-help strategies consider anathema the traditional concept of "appointment television" 4 where viewers access content at a specific time, on a particular channel and via a single display technology. One can anticipate a future when much content reaches consumers via on-demand options instead of the traditional live, broadcast model.
Early adopters of new media expect to have access to content anytime, anywhere, via any device and in any presentation format. Many consumers have no patience with business models that ration content access through a series of display windows that match availability with willingness to pay. For example, movie access traditionally has run a time sequence starting with theatrical presentation and followed by pay per view, DVD sale, premium cable and satellite channel access, DVD rental, broadband download, etc. Many consumers now resort to self-help strategies that achieve access to pirated premium content via multiple screens soon after initial release. Television sets, computer monitors, smartphone screens and tablets offer much of the content previously made available exclusively via the movie screen, or to only one of the many other mediated screen options.
New media options and convergence have the potential to disrupt the business plans of incumbents, but also challenge established legal, regulatory and policy assumptions. However if finding alternative ways to access desired content results in abandonment of existing subscription options by many consumers, content providers and distributors may slow down or end their have long feared some users would 'cut the cord' on pay-television by canceling their MVPD subscription, deciding, instead to choose a potentially competitive 'virtual MVPD' providing video content through the Internet." (Ammori,2010 p.378) . 4 "A secular trend toward narrowcasting has intensified on the web, as more individuals forsake appointment television for the 'long tail' of online content." (Pasquale, 2010, p. 110) . experimentation with new distribution technologies.
5 Alternatively they will more aggressively pursue digital rights management ("DRM") techniques to prevent piracy and even fair use (Raymond, 2013 , Weiser & Parchomovsky, 2011 . 6 In any event, the proliferation of new media access options will require much more coordination between and among the providers of the broadband pathways, commonly referred to as Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") and the providers and distributors of content.
As the Internet has evolved and diversified, interconnection terms and conditions have changed between ISPs as they explore alternatives to conventional models that classify interconnection as either peering 7 or transiting. 8 The former typically involves interconnection between high capacity carriers whose transoceanic and transcontinental traffic volumes generally match thereby eliminating the need for a transfer of funds. Historically smaller carriers have 5 "Many programmers--including both broadcast programmers and non-broadcast programmers--have increasingly begun to circle the wagons with incumbent MVPDs, concluding that they too are better off with a cut of the MVPDs' supra-competitive profits than with the potential wild-west competition enabled by the Internet." (Ammori, 2010, p. 378. 6 Fair use refers to the lawful, but unapproved use of copyrighted content. In the balance between rewarding innovation and promoting access to content, fair use provides opportunities for limited and conditional access to content without securing and paying for a license when such use serves the public interest and causes little or no financial harm to the creator. Peering refers to a barter arrangement for traffic exchange where two Internet Service Providers agree to accept traffic from the other on without the transfer of funds. The carriers agree to a settlement-free arrangement, because traffic volumes generally match.
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Transiting refers to an exchange of traffic that triggers a financial settlement and transfer of funds. This arrangement typically results when a small carrier needs the services of a larger carrier to reach all Internet carriers and end users. paid transit fees to larger Tier-1 ISPs for the opportunity to secure upstream links throughout the Internet cloud.
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With the growing availability of bandwidth intensive, full motion video content carried via the Internet, traffic volume disparities have increased between ISPs. A new category of ISP has targeted the downstream video content delivery market, all but guaranteeing that these Content Delivery Networks ("CDNs") will have more traffic for which they need to secure delivery to end users than what retail ISPs can or will hand off to them for upstream delivery.
Such asymmetry in traffic flows can generate interconnection compensation disputes as occurred between the major CDN for Netflix content, Level3, and a major ISP, Comcast, which provides last mile," retail delivery of Internet content. (Frieden, 2012 , Brenner & Maxwell, 2011 . CDNs typically become transit payers even if previously they qualified for zero cost peering, but questions remain whether retail ISPs, such as Comcast, have an affirmative duty to try offsetting traffic imbalances. Likewise consumers wonder what service commitments a retail ISP should make in exchange for sizeable monthly Internet access subscription revenues.
The migration from CDN peer to transit payer represents one of many adjustments in interconnection compensation arrangements triggered by changes in traffic flows. (Weller & Woodcock, 2013 , Kovacs, 2012 Heretofore commercially driven The Internet cloud refers to the vast array of interconnected networks that make up the Internet and provide users with seamless connectivity to these networks and the content available via these networks. "The increasing functionality of the Internet is decreasing the role of the personal computer. This shift is being led by the growth of "cloud computing"--the ability to run applications and store data on a service provider's computers over the Internet, rather than on a person's desktop computer." (Robison, 2010 (Robison, , p. 1199 
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"By regulating the terms upon which content providers use their networks to reach consumers, broadband providers could manipulate the flow of information in society. For example, Comcast could conceivably block consumer access to websites like www.comcastsucks.org that criticize the company. Perhaps more realistically, Comcast could block or degrade content and applications like Netflix that compete against its other revenuegenerating services. Unlike America Online and other first-generation dial-up Internet access providers, most broadband providers do not specialize in providing Internet access alone. Rather, the largest broadband providers are cable and telephone companies, which have incentives to prevent customers from using their broadband connections in ways that threaten their other revenue streams. For example, consumer groups have expressed concerns that broadband Internet providers that also offer on-demand movie rentals via cable might discriminate against other services (such as Netflix or BitTorrent) that make movies available over a broadband connection." (Lyons, 2012 (Lyons, , p. 1034 Mr. Malone, who led Liberty to take a big stake in cable operator Charter Communications Inc. earlier this year, said in June that, 'Reed has to bear in his economic model some of the cost of the capacity that he's burning. ' He was referring to Reed Hastings, chief executive of Netflix, whose streaming video service has accounted for around a third of total North American Internet traffic every night." (Knutson & Ramachandran, 2013) .
Content providers have balked at making such payments, because they already pay CDNs and other carriers with which they directly interconnect. Additionally retail ISPs charge their customers broadband subscription rates that appear sufficiently compensatory for their costs incurred in providing content access throughout the Internet cloud. This paper will examine existing and likely future interconnection disputes with an eye toward identifying where conflicts will arise and whether commercial negotiations can reach closure on a timely basis. Additionally the paper will examine Internet interconnection models with an eye toward assessing whether National Regulatory Authorities ("NRAs") will need to arbitrate and promote settlements when access via the Internet and other media, such as cable television, becomes blocked or congested. The paper will consider whether ISPs should have the opportunity to provide both end users and content sources with alternatives to traditional "best efforts" content delivery, 12 including "better than best effort" premium service. Additionally the paper will assess whether ISPs can engage in quality of service discrimination without creating artificial congestion as justification for additional compensation.
This research expands on the considerable discussion about whether governments need to safeguard neutral and open access to the Internet. Much of the existing research on "network 12 "The Internet developed initially as an academic curiosity, based on a commitment to the 'end-to-end principle.' This principle requires that all Internet traffic, whether an email, a Voice over Internet Protocol (VoIP) 'call'" or a video stream, be treated equally and managed through 'best efforts' connections. In such a network, data packets pass from one router to another without the prioritization of any particular packets. In practice, this means that Internet traffic reaches its destination at varying times, depending on the traffic levels of the relevant Internet communications links." (Weiser, 2008, p. 277-78) . 
I. Deconstructing the Internet Cloud
Explanations about the interworking of the Internet often use cloud analogies to emphasize the apparent ease with which networks interconnect to form a complete end-to-end link (Robison, 2010) . However, when one examines the actual means by which traffic arrives at its final destination, the Internet constitutes a complex array of facilities operated by different carriers using many types of equipment manufactured by a variety of companies over several generations of innovation. The Internet operates as a "network of networks" (Solum, & Chung, 2004) thanks to the ability of shared operating standards and protocols to make compatible the networks of many carriers using equipment of many manufacturers.
The network of networks and cloud analogies also ignore the complex and potentially contentious matter of financial compensation when a cooperative carrier agrees to route traffic of another carrier onward to its final destination, or to another carrier. Internet carriers initially
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Network neutrality refers to government mandated nondiscrimination, transparency and other requirements on ISPs designed to foster a level competitive playing field among content providers and to establish consumer safeguards so that Internet users have unrestricted access limited only by legitimate concerns such as ISP network management and national security. barter system called peering where carriers agreed to eschew cash settlements on the assumption that a balance of traffic flows existed, or the view that metering traffic would prove too costly.
Interconnection based on assumed parity of traffic volume and the absence of a need to transfer funds sharply contrasts the models used by telephone companies. These carriers never have used a barter system even when parity in traffic flows existed, or when either or both carriers received subsidies to promote universal service and infrastructure expansion into the hinterland. From the onset of service, financial compensation models for telephone carrier 14 The industrial structure of the Internet has tracked four phases:
1) Incubation--government administration, first through the United States Defense Department and later through the United States National Science Foundation and universities and research institutes throughout the world (1980s-1995); 2) Privatization--governments eliminate financial subsidies obligating contractors to assess whether and how to operate commercially (1995) (1996) (1997) (1998) 
Commercialization-private networks proliferate as do ventures creating software applications and content that traverse the Internet. The "dotcom boom" triggers irrational, excessive investment and overcapacity (1998) (1999) (2000) (2001) ; and 4) Diversification-after the dotcom bust and market re-entrenchment, Internet survivors and market entrants expand the array of available services and ISPs offer diversified terms, conditions and rates, including price and quality of service discrimination needed by "mission critical" traffic having high bandwidth requirements, e.g., full motion video content. (Frieden, 2012, p.276) .
interconnection have relied on a negotiated financial settlement based on actual traffic flows. (Huston, n.d., Kende, 2012) .
Over time, as governments have reduced or eliminate subsidies, Internet carriers have recognized the importance of measuring traffic and using financial settlements when traffic volumes lack symmetry. However the migration from peering to payment based transiting has not always occurred smoothly, particularly when commercially driven terms impose new financial obligations on some carriers that previously used the zero payment barter process. In turn these carriers have sought to recoup these costs from end users, particularly the highest volume subscribers. Internet carriers typically offered unmetered, "all you can eat" subscription model in the early phases of development and promotion. Now they consider, or already have migrated to service tiers that place caps on the volume of traffic a subscriber can consume, or slow down transmission delivery speed ("throttling") after a downloading threshold has occurred within one month (Comcast, n.d.) . While arguably more efficient and fair, new metered retail subscription models have triggered much consumer opposition and even assertions that tiering discriminates and reduces the value of a subscription (Bosworth, 2009 ).
The need for Internet carriers to pay attention to traffic flows and the cost of providing peering and transit services to other carriers evidences the importance of network interconnection and perhaps as well its vulnerability. A carrier dissatisfied with the status quo will seek new and more favorable commercial terms to which other carriers may not readily agree. If negotiations reach an impasse the carriers at least temporarily will no longer interconnect and accept traffic from each other. Such "de-peering" typically can occur without service disruption, because 
II. The Impact of Full Motion Video Access
The consequences of retail ISP market dominance have become more significant as consumers increasingly rely on the Internet as a "one stop shop" for access to all forms of ICE.
With the wider availability of broadband network access, consumers now can use the Internet as a medium for the delivery of full motion video like that previously available only from broadcast, cable and satellite television. Some consumers have "cut the cord" by abandoning legacy services and opting for access to video content exclusively via the Internet. An ever increasing inventory of choices has become available to alternative video display screens. The terms Internet Protocol Television ("IPTV") and Over-the-Top Television ("OTT") refer to the ability of content creators and new or existing content distributors to provide consumers with access to video content via broadband links, in lieu of, or in addition to traditional media.
IPTV options, which include such popular sites as Netflix, Hulu and Youtube, offer consumers greater flexibility in accessing content. Viewers no longer need to tolerate "appointment television" (Clancy, 2011) access to content at a time prescribed by content creators or distributors and available only on a single broadcast, satellite, or cable channel.
Access is becoming a matter of using one of several software-configured interface options capable of delivering live and recorded content anytime, anywhere, to any device and via many different transmission and presentation formats. But as empowering as these technological options appeal, they rely on a very small number of options for the final delivery to consumers.
Cable modem service providers, DSL carriers and wireless operators provide the essential last kilometer delivery of content and the ever increasing volume of downstream traffic satisfying IPTV demand provides these carriers with increasing leverage in interconnection negotiations.
One cannot yet conclude that retail ISPs regularly abuse their control of a last kilometer bottleneck, but the growing number of interconnection disputes between ISPs as well as other ICE ventures should trigger concern. Because more traffic arrives at retail ISP switching facilities, these carriers enjoy opportunities to demand compensation even from other ISPs with which they previously had a zero cost peering arrangement. The possibility exists that retail ISPs will negotiate fairly and not act on the incentives and ability to meddle with downstream traffic flows to secure greater leverage in interconnection negotiations.
However one also can anticipate instances where a retail ISP does not refrain from exploiting the opportunity to demand more than a fair share. Already some retail ISPs have expressed the view that they should receive compensation from up to three sources: 1) end user monthly subscriptions for Internet access; 2) upstream ISPs and CDNs with which they directly interconnect and deliver more traffic than they generate for upstream carriage; and 3) some content creators and distributors with which they do not directly interconnect, but which generate the highest volume of downstream traffic, e.g., Netflix.
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Should retail ISPs overplay their control of access to end-users, the prospect increases for closer scrutiny by legislatures, NRAs and boards with authority to implement competition policy and sanction unfair trade practices. In nations where ISPs have qualified for little regulation, abuse of their retail bottleneck may trigger legislatures to reclassify Internet access so that some public utility, essential facility, or common carrier responsibilities apply.
A. Treatment of Content Delivery Networks
The most contentious recent interconnection disputes among ISPs has involved retail ISPs and Content Delivery Networks ("CDNs"), a new category identifying ventures that concentrate on providing downstream delivery of full motion video (Clark & Blumenthal, 2011) .
By emphasizing downstream services, CDNs all but guarantee traffic imbalances with interconnecting carriers, especially retail ISPs. In late 2010 Comcast, a major retail ISP in the United States, sought to impose a surcharge on traffic volumes generated by Level 3, a Tier-1 ISP and CDN, in light of a significant increase in downstream traffic generated by Level 3 after 15 "
[I]n negotiations that almost never become public, the world's biggest Internet providers and video services argue over how much one network should pay to connect to another. When these negotiations fail, users suffer. In other words, bad video performance is often caused not just by technology problems but also by business decisions made by the companies that control the Internet." (Brodkin, 2013) . it secured the opportunity to serve as the primary carrier for delivering Netflix movies and television programs content to subscribers.
Level 3 sought regulatory relief at the Federal Communications Commission ("FCC") and also launched a public relations campaign to frame the dispute in terms of Comcast imposing a "toll booth" on the Internet and singling out Level 3 and Netflix traffic for a surcharge to raise the cost of a major alternative to Comcast's pay per view movie services. 16 Comcast responded with an equally forceful campaign to explain that the dispute simply addressed a commercial peering matter. 17 "By taking this action, Comcast is effectively putting up a toll booth at the borders of its broadband Internet access network, enabling it to unilaterally decide how much to charge for content which competes with its own cable TV and Xfinity delivered content." (Level 3, 2010) .
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"The bottom line is that this is a good, old-fashioned commercial peering dispute. It is not about online video, it is not a net neutrality issue, it is not about 'paid prioritization,' and it does not involve putting 'toll booths' on the Internet." (Comcast, 2010) . The companies used techniques to identify the Internet Protocol addresses used by broadband subscribers of the cable companies with which they had a retransmission dispute. By identifying these subscribers' identities, the companies succeeded in blocking cable broadband subscribers' access to video content available at the CBS and Hulu web sites. These content creators had a perverse incentive to deny access to eager viewers despite a reduction in audience ratings and the commensurate impact on advertising revenues. The companies understood that they had more to gain from higher cable television operator retransmission fees and willingly used Internet access blocking techniques to secure even more negotiating leverage.
The ability of CBS and Fox to block access to content far away from retail ISP facilities identifies a new location where carrier interconnection can dispute can arise and frustrate consumers. Much of the debate about network neutrality has focused on the incentive and ability of retail ISPs to operate in discriminatory ways that could favor corporate affiliates and other content providers and distributors willing to pay a surcharge for preferential delivery services.
By blocking access to content far upstream at the source, or between the source and a content aggregator, such as Hulu, CBS and Fox have shown how selective blocking of another type of network interconnection in the Internet cloud can occur much to the dismay and displeasure of consumers who find themselves denied access to content based on who provides their broadband access to the Internet cloud.
Likely Changes in Cloud Interconnection Arrangements
ISPs already have used commercial negotiations to structure alternatives and adjustments to the traditional dichotomy of barter (peering) or payment (transiting) (Yoo, 2010) . Such diversification in interconnection compensation largely results from the proliferation of ventures requiring access as well as growing differences in the number of subscribers, points of interconnection, available transmission capacity, portion of the total traffic carried constituting video and the volume of traffic received from and handed off to particular ISPs.
The structure and bargaining power of Internet carriers has become somewhat less hierarchical, particularly for ISPs that do not qualify for Tier-1 status. These ISPs may handle significant traffic, but the volume may be limited to retail services in specific localities, or concentrated in specific geographical regions. Many carriers that do not qualify as Tier-1 ISPs have agreed to interconnect with other similarly situated operators, often at mutually convenient locations where many carriers and even content providers locate equipment. Such interconnection supports the creation of a new or increased set of Tier-2 carriers and the use of Internet Exchange Points which serve as mutually convenient and centralized interconnection locations (Engebretson , 2013 , Jensen, 2012 . ISPs also have increased the number of carriers with which they interconnect. This process, commonly referred to as multihoming, can improve the speed of content delivery and achieve more reliable service.
ISPs, which do not qualify for peering now, can secure most of the benefits of direct interconnection with major carriers, by paying them. This paid peering process The CDN and its upstream sources of content may object to a payment obligation in addition to the sizeable Internet access charges paid by the retail ISPs' subscribers. Arguably a retail ISP subscription includes a representation that the carrier will provide Internet access service at a particular delivery speed. If subscribers make increased use of a resource the carrier would prefer they not actually use, then the remedy lies in download caps and/or higher service fees, rather than demands for compensation from upstream carriers. The alternative view favoring retail ISPs narrows scrutiny to the commercial relationship between the upstream venture and applies the peering/transit dichotomy, or a recent alternative such as paid peering.
CDNs and other upstream carriers also will dispute economic rationales that support double payments to retail ISPs based simply on the premise that they operate in a two-sided market: 1) the retail, Internet access service provided to end users and 2) the wholesale, downstream delivery service provided upstream ISPs and their content produce/distributor clients Weisman & Kulick, 2010; Rysman, 2009) . Regardless whether ISPs can invoke economic rationales, bottleneck control of access to very many "eyeballs" puts them in a superior negotiating posture with upstream ventures. Recently some retail ISPs have proposed to content providers direct payment models in exchange for superior access to end users, or an agreement not to debit their traffic from end user monthly downloading caps (Brodkin, 2013) .
Content Provider/Distributor Self-Help
Facing the growing likelihood that retail ISPs will demand compensation above that provided by Internet access subscriptions, content providers and distributors have pursued alternatives to using CDNs and paid peering. Ventures like Netflix understand that they need to ensure high quality video reception. They strive to reduce delivery costs, but also reduce the distance between the origination point for content delivery and its consumption by subscribers.
For example, Netflix has proposed that ISPs partner with it in an "Open Connect Network." (Netflix, 2012) . In application this program appears to convert Netflix into an ISP with one downstream customer, itself, but also with the ability to provide upstream service exceeding 2 Gigabits per second. Netflix also proposes to install equipment on retail ISP premises that will store the most popular content thereby eliminating the need to use a cascade of many ISPs providing a portion of the route used to download the content (Netflix, n.d.) .
Netflix promotes new interconnection arrangements as a way to reduce burdens on retail ISP carriers, including fewer subscriber service complaints and the need to increase bandwidth to handle the downstream torrent of full motion video content. However Netflix does not appear willing to pay for peering, despite the fact that direct interconnection with retail ISPs probably will reduce Netflix's total content delivery costs and reduce paid peering revenues generated by Netflix's CDNs. As the Open Connect Network grows, Netflix's need to rely on CDN services declines as the company installs or leases transmission capacity for direct interconnection with retail ISPs.
The Short and Long Term
In the short term ISPs will continue to negotiate customized interconnection arrangements when traditional and conventional models do not suffice. Such flexibility can accommodate specialized requirements of content creators, distributors and consumers.
However they also can impose anticompetitive and unfair trade practices that both consumers and regulators may not readily undercover.
18
Examples of the former include accommodation of consumers' desire for "better than best efforts" traffic routing of "mission critical bits." Video gamers and viewers of high 18 "MVPDs are often a customer's broadband provider as well, which means that customers who cut the cord are likely using the broadband Internet service provided by their MVPD to go 'over the top' of the MVPD's own video services. This conflict between MVPDs, content providers, and consumers is at the center of concerns that MVPDs might engage in anticompetitive practices against broadband video services in order to protect their core video business." (Vanwagner, 2011 (Vanwagner, , p. 2919 . Another potential anticompetitive practice lies in a deliberate strategy of generating congestion for the traffic generated by a single venture. Retail ISPs can identify and target a particular carrier or source of content for deliberately degraded service. For example, if a retail ISP wanted to force an upstream carrier or content source to pay a surcharge on grounds that they have increased their carriage demands, the retail ISP could reduce or refuse to expand the inventory of available capacity available for the delivery of all or some types of traffic generated by the targeted company. A number of content creators and distributors have claimed that retail ISPs have generated artificial congestion, because the retail ISP has ample downstream capacity, but assigned insufficient channel and port capacity ensuring congestion for a subset of all downstream traffic. In a nutshell, upstream carriers and content creators/distributors have claimed that they encounter degraded service based on the saturation of the capacity made available to them even as other ventures, including corporate affiliates, partners and surcharge payers, encounter no such problem (Malik, 2013 , Marek, 2013 .
In both the short and long run, parties will dispute whether a retail ISP truly has incurred network congestion as a result of increased downstream volume, or as a result of clever network management designed to create congestion for some, but not all users. More broadly parties will dispute what constitutes reasonable and necessary network management. While a retail ISP surely owns its property and can manage it in any way it sees fit, the carrier can use the necessity of network management as justification for anticompetitive and unreasonable trade practices.
The history of telecommunications carrier interconnection contains very many instances where parties deliberately refused to cooperate, and instead pursued many strategies to handicap competitors through outright refusals to deal, inferior and more expensive arrangements, delays and time consuming litigation (United States v. Western Electric Co. 1987). Bear in mind that carriers could frustrate competition, despite having a legal requirement to deal and interconnect as common carriers, subject to unquestionable regulatory oversight. In the Internet ecosystem, most nations do not regulate ISPs, or apply a far less burdensome regulatory regime than that applied to telephone companies.
If clever telecommunications service providers could avoid and evade regulatory mandates to interconnect fully and fairly, unregulated or lightly regulated ventures can do so as well. Marketplace driven self-discipline may not guarantee that every interconnection negotiation will reach closure on a timely basis with reasonable terms and conditions, particularly where one venture enjoys disproportionately greater negotiating leverage.
In both the short and long run ISPs with market power need to curb their incentives to gouge and discriminate excessively. Even through discriminatory tactics can be masked and not easily identified, over time consumers may understand the cause of service degradation and punish the culprit. If retail ISPs push too far to maximize revenues, they risk upsetting the balance needed when pricing in a two-sided market as well as losing their unregulated status.
Despite a preference for unregulated, commercial negotiations, carriers that abuse market power risk punishment in the court of public opinion and in the marketplace. The possibility exists that in the longer term every leg in the Internet cloud will become sufficiently competitive, or at least one or more ISPs will emphasize neutrality and fair dealing as a market differentiating feature. Governments should defer to commercially driven interconnection arrangements, but stand ready to resolve disputes that become intractable and harmful to consumers.
